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Bad design and software defects often make source codes hard to understand and 
lead to maintenance difficulties. In order to detect and fix such defects, researchers have 
systematically investigated these issues and designed different effective algorithms to 
tackle the problems. However, most of these methods need source codes/models for 
defect detection and correction. Commercial companies, like banks, may not be willing to 
provide their source models due to data security. Therefore, it is a huge challenge to 
detect software detects by a consulting company as well as to keep source models 
confidential. This thesis analyze security issues in existing approaches related to defect 
detection and develop secure protocols to allow a software corporation and a consulting 
company to exchange data securely without revealing any private information, which 
make the approach practical in reality. The experimental results confirm the effectiveness 
of the proposed approach. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my gratitude to my academic advisor Dr. Wei Jiang for the 
remarks and engagement through the learning process of this master thesis. Without his 
funding supports and kindly help, it is impossible for me to finish all research work and 
graduate from Computer Science department. Furthermore I would like to thank the 
committee members, Dr. Dan Lin and Dr. Marouane Kessentini for their useful 
comments. Also, I like to thank my family members, who have supported me throughout 
entire process. Finally, I must thank all my dear friends who have helped me and 
encouraged me ever. 
 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii 
SECTION 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. PROBLEM BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 1 
1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................. 2 
2. RELATED WORK ..................................................................................................... 6 
2.1. INTRODUCTION OF EXISTING APPROACHES .......................................... 6 
2.2. KESSENTINI’S APPROACH............................................................................ 8 
2.2.1. Defect Detection. ...................................................................................... 8 
2.2.2. Defect Correction ................................................................................... 13 
3. SECURITY ISSUES AND A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP ................... 15 
3.1. SECURITY ISSUES IN KESSENTINI’S APPROACH ................................. 15 
3.2. INTRODUCTION OF TTP .............................................................................. 15 
3.3. A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP ........................................................ 17 
3.4. COMPARISON TO IDEAL TTP MODELS ................................................... 18 
4. PRIVACY-PERSERVING DDC PROTOCOLS ..................................................... 20 
4.1. THE ROLE OF SECURE PROTOCOLS......................................................... 20 
4.2. SECURE INTEGER COMPARISON .............................................................. 21 
4.3. THRESHOLD EVALUATION ALGORITHM ............................................... 24 
4.4. USING SECURE SET INTERSECTION TO COMPUTE FITNESS ............. 24 
4.5. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT DETECTION ..................................... 26 
4.6. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT CORRECTION .................................. 28 
4.7. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 29 
4.8. COMPARISON TO TTP MODELS ................................................................ 29 
5. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS ............................... 31 
vi 
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ................................................................................. 35 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................. 38 
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 39 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 44 






LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
               Page 
Figure 2.1. Overview of the approach ................................................................................ 8 
Figure 2.2. A tree representation of an individual rule ....................................................... 9 
Figure 2.3. Mutation operator ........................................................................................... 12 
Figure 2.4. Crossover operator.......................................................................................... 13 
Figure 3.1. TTP model in defect detection ....................................................................... 17 
Figure 3.2. TTP model in defect correction ...................................................................... 18 
 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
               Page 
Table 2.1. List of related notation ..................................................................................... 10 
Table 6.1. Program Statistics ............................................................................................ 36 
Table 6.2. Running Time Comparison(Seconds) .............................................................. 37 




1.1. PROBLEM BACKGROUND 
In typical software life cycles, software maintenance mainly includes 
adding/removing functionalities, detecting maintainability defects, correcting them, and 
modifying the code to improve its quality. Although maintainability defects are 
sometimes unavoidable, they should be removed from the code base as early as possible. 
However, detecting and removing are difficult, time-consuming, and to some extent, a 
manual process. To detect design defects automatically, several automated detection 
techniques have been proposed [14] [13] [17] [23], which are proved effective to improve 
software quality. In these settings, detection rules are manually defined or based on a 
huge mount of quality metrics. However, for most small software companies, they do not 
have enough resources to design complicated detection tools and collect rich rules or 
quality metrics. Then it is worthy employing a consultant who has professional skills and 
experience to diagnose source models and correct potential unreasonable defects. 
Unfortunately, even though a plenty of research work has been done regarding 
how to detect and remove software defects, few of them considered privacy issues in 
their approaches. Certainly, it is in commercial companies’ best interests not to disclose 
source codes, source models or any private information to others in the process of 
software evaluation. Then it is a huge challenge for us to preserve privacy without 
sharing source models, quality metrics, detection rules and algorithms between them. To 
better understand the problem, this thesis will first review the typical process of software 
defect detection and correction, and then discuss the privacy issues in the process. 
Software maintainability defects, also called design anomalies, refer to design 
situations that adversely affect the maintenance of software. Maintainability defects are 
unlikely to cause failures directly, but may cause them indirectly. In general, they make a 
system difficult to change, which may in turn introduce bugs. Software defect detection 
refers to find software defects with a set of quality metrics, and correction is the process 
to fix them with series of refactoring operations. For example, to correct the blob defect, 
many operations can be used to reduce the number of functionalities in a specific class: 
move methods, extract class, etc. Opdyke defines refactoring as the process of improving 
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a code after it has been written by changing its internal structure without changing its 
external behavior. The idea is to reorganize variables, classes and methods in order to 
facilitate future extensions. This reorganization is used to improve different aspects of 
software-quality: reusability, maintainability, complexity, etc. 
The work [13] presents an effective approach to detect and correct software 
defects, which is based on Genetic Algorithm (GA). This approach mainly includes two 
steps. In the first step, it generates detection rules from an initial set of rules representing 
random combinations of metrics. Then, Genetic Programming (GP) is applied to refine 
this set progressively according to each individual rule’s ability to detect defects in the 
example base. This process takes defect examples from source models as input, and its 
objective is to prevent sharing source models’ information with consultants in this step. 
After generating the detection rules, this approach uses them in the correction step. It 
starts by generating some solutions that represent a combination of refactoring operations 
and then evaluate them by their ability to correct defects. Eventually, the best solution 
would correct most detected defects. 
However, the approach [13] has some limitations, too. First, it has to access 
source models to execute detection rules; second, it will take source models as input to 
fix detected defects in correction step. All of these operations will disclose source models 
to consulting corporations so that it may not be acceptable by most commercial 
companies. In this thesis, new security protocols are proposed to overcome some of the 
mentioned limitations and the new approach will allow a consulting company to evaluate 
a commercial banks’ software without revealing any private information. At the 
beginning, the concept of Trusted Third Party (TTP) [11] is introduced to model secure 
defect detection and correction. Two parties can communicate safely with the TTP and do 
not need to worry about security issues because TTP cannot disclose a party’s private 
information to the other. Next, secure protocols are designed to replace the TTP such that 
during the execution of the protocols, the private information is never disclosed. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
To better understand the thesis’ contribution, it is important to define the 
problems of defect detection and correction, and the privacy preserving process. This 
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section will first introduce the definitions of important concepts related to the new 
proposed protocols, and then emphasize on the specific problems that are tackled by the 
approach. 
Defect Detection and Correction (DDC): The defect detection process consists of 
finding code fragments that violate structure or semantic properties on code elements 
such as coupling and complexity. The detected correction refers to fix these defects by 
applying refactoring operations. 
The functions Defect Detection and Defect Correction could be defined as below. 
 
1Defect_Detection( , )i iR S R+→                                                                             (1) 
• Input: iR  represents the detection rules obtained in iteration i  and 
S denotes the source model 
• Output: 1iR +  represents the detection rules generated and evaluated in 
iteration 1i +  
 
The algorithm generates initial detection rules 0R  from quality metrics and applies these 
rules to detect defects in source models. Then it will evaluate each rule set based on its 
ability to detect the number of defects. Next, it may generate new rule set 1R  and evaluate 
them again. Eventually, it outputs the best rule set rˆ , which can detect most defects in 
source models, after n iterations. 
 
1ˆDefect_Correction( , , )j jr f S f +→                                                                     (2) 
• Input: rˆ  denotes the best detection rules obtained from Defect Detection, 
and fj represents refactoring operations generated in iteration j , S  is the source 
model. 
• Output: the refactoring set 1jf +  generated and evaluated in iteration 1j +  
 
Initially, the algorithm generates a set of refactoring operations 0f  and applies them to fix 
detected defects in source models. Then it detects remaining defects with rˆ  and evaluates 
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the set of refactoring based on its ability to correct defects. Next, it will generate new 
refactoring operations 1f  and evaluate them too. At last, it will return the best refactoring 
set ˆf  which would fix most detected defects. 
Secure Defect Detection and Correction (SDDC): preserve both parties’ private 
information while following the general DDC process. Suppose 1P , e.g. a consulting 
company, owns a set of quality metrics and refactoring; 2P , e.g. a commercial bank, has 
private source models. SDDC allows 1P  to apply quality metrics to detect software 
defects in 2P ’s source models and fix them without revealing 1P ’s quality metrics, 
detection and correction algorithms to 2P ; or disclosing 2P ’s source models to 1P . In 
detection stage, SDDC will take source models, quality metrics as input, and output best 
detection rules after iterations. Next, SDDC refines refactoring operations and evaluate 
them with these rules; eventually generates optimal refactoring solutions as output, which 
would correct most defects in source models. 
Secure Defect Detection and Secure Defect Correction functions are defined as 
the following. 
 
1 2 1 1Defect_Detection (( , ), ( , )) ( , )s i iP R P S P R +→                                                   (3) 
• Input: 1( , )iP R  represents 1P ’s private detection rules obtained in iteration 
i  and 2( , )P S  is the source model of 2P  
• Output: the rule set 1iR +  which is generated and evaluated in iteration 1i + , 
only 1P  gets 1iR +  
 
Equation (3) is similar to Equation (2), and it starts from generating initial detection rule 
0R . Eventually, it outputs the best rule set rˆ  which can detect most defects. 
 
1 2 1 1ˆDefect_Correction (( , , ), ( , )) ( , )s j jP r f P S P f +→                                              (4) 
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• Input: 1 ˆ( , , )jP r f  includes two parts; rˆ  is the best rule set obtained from (3) 
which can detected most defects in source models, and jf  is 1P ’s refactoring 
generated in iteration j ; 2( , )P S  denotes the source model of 2P  
• Output: the refactoring set 1jf +  which is generated and evaluated by 1P  in 
iteration 1j +  
 
Similarly, Equation (4) starts from generating the initial set of refactoring operations 0f  
to fix detected defects. In iteration j , it outputs 1jf +  which will be the input of iteration 
1j + . At last, 1P  gets the best refactoring set ˆf  which would fix most detected defects 
and then 1P  will send ˆf  to 2P  to fix the defects in source models. 
Equation (3) and Equation (4) are very similar to Equation (1) and Equation (2) 
except that they will preserve both parties’ private information in the process of defect 
detection and correction. Both parties own some private items. For 1P , he has four private 
items: first, the quality metrics; second, the best rule set; third, the process of the best rule 
set generation; last, the process to generate the optimal refactoring set. Meanwhile, 2P  
only owns private source models. The thesis will propose a new approach to implement 
algorithms defined by Equation (3) and Equation (4), and fulfill security property at the 
same time. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to 
the related work and background. The TTP model is outlined in Section 3. In Section 4, 
the thesis gives an overview of secure protocols. Then, Section 5 discusses security and 
communication analysis and Section 6 presents the validation results. Future research 
directions are summarized and suggested in Section 7.  
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2. RELATED WORK 
2.1. INTRODUCTION OF EXISTING APPROACHES 
The techniques regarding detecting and fixing design defects range from fully 
automatic detection and correction to guided manual inspection. Design defect detection 
and correction can be classified into three broad categories: rules-based detection-
correction, detection and correction combination, and visual-based detection. 
In the first category, Marinescu [18] defined a list of rules relying on metrics to 
detect defects which are at method, class and subsystem levels. Erni and Lewerentz [6] 
introduce the concept of multi-metrics, n-tuples of metrics expressing a quality criterion 
(e.g., modularity) to evaluate frameworks and improve them. Both of the two existing 
solutions require users to manually define threshold values for metrics in the rules, which 
is the main limitation of them. To handle this problem, Alikacem and Sahraoui express 
defect detection as fuzzy rules, with fuzzy labels for metrics, e.g., small, medium, large, 
and evaluate the rules by means of membership functions. Although no crisp thresholds 
need to be defined, it is not obvious to determine the membership functions. Moha et al. 
[19], in their DÉCOR approach, they start by describing defect symptoms using an 
abstract rule language. These descriptions involve different notions, such as class roles 
and structures. The descriptions are later mapped to detection algorithms. In addition to 
the threshold problem, this approach uses heuristics to approximate some notions, which 
results in a high rate of false positives. Khomh et al. [15] extended DECOR to support 
uncertainty and to sort the defect candidates accordingly. The majority of existing 
approaches to automate refactoring activities are based on rules that can be expressed as 
assertions (invariants, pre- and post-conditions), or graph transformations. The use of 
invariants has been proposed to detect parts of program that require refactoring by 
Kataoka et al. [12]. Opdyke [22] suggested the use of pre- and post-condition with 
invariants to preserve the behavior of the software. All these conditions could be 
expressed in the form of rules. Heckel [10] considers refactorings activities as graph 
production rules (programs expressed as graphs). However, a full specification of 
refactorings would require a large number of rules. In addition, refactoring-rules sets 
have to be complete, consistent, non redundant, and correct. Furthermore, the algorithm 
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needs to find the best sequence of applying these refactoring rules. In such situations, 
search-based techniques represent a good alternative. 
In the second category of work, these approaches refactor a system by detecting 
elements to change to improve the global quality. For example, in [21], defect detection 
is considered as an optimization problem. The authors use a combination of 12 metrics to 
measure the improvements achieved when sequences of simple refactorings are applied, 
such as moving methods between classes. The goal of the optimization is to determine 
the sequence that maximizes a function, which captures the variations of a set of metrics 
[9].The fact that the quality in terms of metrics is improved does not necessary means 
that the changes make sense. The link between defect and correction is not obvious, 
which make the inspection difficult for the maintainers. 
The high rate of false positives generated by the automatic approaches 
encouraged other researchers to explore semiautomatic solutions. These solutions took 
the form of visualization-based environments. The primary goal is to take advantage of 
the human ability to integrate complex contextual information in the detection process. 
Kothari et al. [16] presented a pattern-based framework for developing tool support to 
detect software anomalies by representing potential defects with different colors. Later, 
Dhambri et al. [5] proposed a visualization-based approach to detect design anomalies by 
automatically detecting some symptoms. The visualization metaphor was chosen 
specifically to reduce the complexity of dealing with a large amount of data. Still, the 
visualization approach is not obvious when evaluating large-scale systems. Moreover, the 
visualized information is metric-based and is difficult to detect complex relationships. In 
Kessentini’s approach  [13], human intervention is needed only to provide defect 
examples. Finally, the use of visualization techniques is limited to the detection step. 
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2.2. KESSENTINI’S APPROACH 
Kessentini investigated limitations of the existing approaches and proposed a 
search-based refactoring scheme, which is the most effective one now. In this section, 
first let’s review the detection and correction phases of this algorithm, and then analyze 
its security issues in practice. Figure 2.1 shows the general structure of the approach. It 
includes two important steps: 1) defects detection and 2) correction. The detection step 
takes a base example (i.e., a set of defects examples) and a set of quality metrics as inputs, 
and generates a set of rules as output. The generation process can generate the best set of 
rules that detect the maximum number of defects. 
The correction step takes the generated detection rules and a set of refactoring 
operations as inputs, and generates a sequence of refactoring as output. The process can 
generate the best set of refactoring that minimizes the number of detected defects using 











Figure 2.1. Overview of the approach 
 
2.2.1. Defect Detection.  The detection process starts from an initial set of rules 
representing random combinations of metrics. In order to understand the process, readers 
have to learn how to generate initial rules first. In fact, quality metrics (logic program) is 
represented as a forest of ANDOR trees. For example, consider the following logic 
program: 
 
C1: defect (blob) :- locClass (upper, 1500), locMethod (upper,129). 
C2: defect (blob) :- nmd (upper, 100). 
C3: defect (spaghettiCode) :- locMethod (upper,151). 
C4: defect (functionalDecomposition) :- nPrivField (upper,7), nmd (equal,16). 
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These logic programs can serve to build the defect detection rules. The set of rules C1-C4 
can be described as the following: 
 
R1 : IF (LOCCLASS ≥  1500 ∧  LOCMETHOD ≥  129) ∨  (NMD ≥  100) THEN
 defect = blob 
R2 : IF (LOCMETHOD ≥  151) THEN defect = spaghetti code 
R3 : IF (NPRIVFIELD ≥  7 ∧  NMD = 16) THEN defect = functional 
 decomposition 
 
Thus, the first rule is represented as a sub-tree of nodes (AND-OR, metrics) as shown in 
Figure 2.2. The main program tree will be a composition of three sub-trees: R1 AND R2 
AND R3. This example contains several special terms whose meanings are listed as 
below and shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Blob: It is found in designs where one large class monopolizes the behavior of a 
 system (or part of it), and other classes primarily encapsulate data. 
Spaghetti Code: It is a code with a complex and tangled control structure. 
 Functional Decomposition: It occurs when a class is designed with the intent of 
 performing a single function. This is found in code produced by non-experienced 















Table 2.1. List of related notation 
Notation Description 
LOCCLASS the number of lines of code in each class 
LOCMETHOD the number of lines of code in each method 
NMD the number of methods 
NPRIVFIELD the number of private fields 
 
After initial rule set generation, this set is refined progressively according to its 
ability to detect defects present in the example base. Due to the very large number of 
possible rules (metric combinations), it uses a rule induction heuristic, called Genetic 
Programming (GP) to find a near-optimal set of detection rules. This approach’s defect 
detection algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. 
In fact, Equation (1) describes only an iteration of GP, but Algorithm 1 shows the 
whole process. It takes initial rule set and source models containing defect examples as 
input. Lines 2 construct an initial GP population, based on a given rule set 0R . The 
population stands for a set of possible solutions representing detection rules (metrics 
combination). Lines 4-20 encode the main GP loop, which searches for the best metrics 
combination. During each iteration, it evaluates the quality of each solution (individual) 
in the population, and the solution having the best fitness is saved. It generates a new 
population of solutions using the crossover operator (line 18) to the selected solutions; 
each pair of parent solutions produces two children (new solutions). It includes the parent 
and child variants in the population and then applies the mutation operator to each variant; 
this produces the population for the next generation. The algorithm terminates when it 
achieves the termination criteria (maximum iteration number), and return the best set of 
detection rules (solution). 
 
Algorithm 1 Defect_Detection(R0,S) 




3: fitness_ rˆ =0 
4: while i≤m do 
5:     fitness_ rˆ i=0 
6:     for all rj in Ri do 
7:         detected_defects_rj=Execute_Rules(rj,S) 
8:          fitness_rj=Compare(detected_defects_rj,S) 
9:         if  fitness_ rˆ i＜fitness_rj then 
10:            fitness_ rˆ i=fitness_rj 
11:           rˆ i=rj 
12:        end if 
13:    end for 
14:     if  fitness_ rˆ ＜fitness_ rˆ i then 
15:           fitness_ rˆ = ˆ_fitness r i 
16:           rˆ = rˆ i 
17:     end if 
18:     Ri+1=Generate_New_Population(Ri) 
19:     i=i+1 
20: end while 
21: return rˆ  
 
GP is introduced here to generate new rules. It generates new offsprings using 
selection, crossover or mutation in each iteration. New generated rules will be executed 
in next iteration and it will be saved as the new best solution if its fitness value is greater 
than current saved rules. 
• Selection 
For the initial prototype, it uses stochastic universal samplying (SUS) 
 selection algorithm, in which each individual’s probability of selection is 
 directly proportional to its relative fitness in the population. 
• Mutation 
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It starts by randomly selected a node in the tree. Then, if the selected node  is a 
terminal (quality metric), it is replaced by another terminal (metric or another 
threshold value); if it is a function (and-or), it is replaced by a new  function; and 
if tree mutation is to be carried out, the node and its sub-tree are replaced by a 
new randomly generated sub-tree. Figure 2.3 shows an example of the mutation 
operation. 
• Crossover 
Two parent individuals are selected and a sub-tree is picked on each one. Then 
crossover swaps the nodes and their relative sub-trees from one parent to the other. 
Figure 2.4 shows an example of the crossover process. The rule 1R  and a rule 2R  
form another individual (solution) are combined to generate new two rules. 
OR














Figure 2.3. Mutation operator 
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Figure 2.4. Crossover operator 
 
 
2.2.2. Defect Correction After generating the detection rules, it uses them in the 
correction step. As shown in Algorithm 2, it starts by generating the initial solution 0f  
that represents a combination of refactoring operations to apply. The defect correction 
algorithm takes the best detection rule set rˆ , initial refactoring set 0f  and source models 
as input. Then it executes the refactoring sequence on source models. Next, a fitness 
function calculates, after applying the proposed refactoring, the number of remaining 
defects using the detection rules. At last, the best solution ^ f which has the minimum 
fitness value is returned. Due to the large number of refactoring combination, a Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) is used. 
  
Algorithm 2 Defect_Correction( rˆ ,f0,S) 




3: fitness_ ˆf =MAX_INTEGER 
4: while i ≤  n do 
5:     Excute_Refactorings(fi, S) 
6:    detected_defects=Execute_Rules( rˆ ,S) 
7:     fitness_fi=｜detected_defects︱ 
8:     if  fitness_ ˆf ＞ fitness_fi then 
9:          fitness_ ˆf =fitness_fi 
10:       ˆf = fi 
11:    end if 
12:     fi+1 = Generate_New_Population(fi) 
13:     i=i+1 
14:  end while 
15:  return ˆf  
 
The approach views the set of potential solutions as points in an n-dimensional 
space, where each dimension corresponds to one refactoring operation, or called logic 
predicate. Initially, it generates a sequence of refactoring and executes them on the 
detected defects. Then, Genetic Algorithm is applied. The crossover operator creates two 
offspring from the two selected parents and the mutation operator will randomly change a 
dimension (refactoring) with a new refactoring. After applying crossover and mutation 
operators, the algorithm will generate a set of new refactoring. Then the new refactoring 
operations will be executed on source codes again. 
Every set of generated refactoring can be viewed as a new correction solution and 
a defined fitness function quantifies the quality of the proposed refactoring. In fact, the 
fitness function checks to minimize the number of detected defects using the detection 
rules. At last, the algorithm will generate the best correction solutions, which are 
combinations of refactoring operations, and should minimize, as much as possible, the 
number of defects detected using the detection rules. 
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3. SECURITY ISSUES AND A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP 
3.1. SECURITY ISSUES IN KESSENTINI’S APPROACH 
In this subsection, the thesis will analyze security issues in Kessentini’s scheme 
and then propose a naive solution based on TTP. As said in Section 1.1, in the whole 
process, 1P  has four private items and 2P  owns private source models. In fact, these 
private items could be classified as two different types of privacy: data privacy and 
algorithm privacy. 
• Data Privacy 
Certainly, quality metrics and the detection rules which are combinations of these 
metrics are valuable for 1P . Meanwhile, for 2P , source models are its private data. 
Therefore, both parties’ data privacies in the whole process have to be preserved 
and each party’s private data should not be disclosed to the other. In order to 
preserve data privacy, such secure protocols are desired, which implement all 
features of Equation (1) and (2), and also have security property at the same time. 
In fact, most interaction and data exchange happen in the two functions Execute 
Rules  and Compare in detection and correction algorithms, so the main goal of 
this thesis is to design secure versions of the two functions. 
• Algorithm Privacy  
Besides private data, the processes of finding best detection rule set and best 
 refactoring operations are private, too. 1P  will not allow 2P  to learn them or apply 
 these algorithms to evaluate its software by itself later. Therefore, the secure 
 protocols should fulfill data privacy and preserve algorithm privacy, too. 
 
3.2. INTRODUCTION OF TTP  
The goal is to implement Equations (3) and (4) with security property and the 
thesis will take two steps to achieve such target. First, it redesigns Equations (1)/(2) to 
fulfill the requirements Equations (3)/(4) by adding a trusted third party in the process. 
Then, it designs new secure protocols that can act as the same roles as TTPs. A trusted 
third party (TTP) can be described as an entity trusted by other entities with respect to 
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security-related services and activities. TTP is an impartial intermediary whose role is to 
ensure that each party receives the item it expects. It is assumed that the TTP is neutral, 
available and trusted by all groups. Sometimes, more than one TTP might be involved in 
a transaction. Typically, a TTP will be an organization licensed or accredited by a 
regulatory authority, which will provide security services, on a commercial basis, to a 
wide range of bodies, including those within the telecommunications, finance and retail 
sectors.  
The use of TTPs is dependent on the fundamental requirement that the TTP is 
trusted by the entities it serves to perform certain functions. In practice, TTPs could exist 
in both public and corporate domains, at the local, national and international level. TTPs 
should have trust agreements arranged with other TTPs to form a network, thus allowing 
a user to communicate securely with every user of every TTP with whom his TTP has an 
agreement. Any TTP scheme should also allow for both national and international 
operation, allowing users in any country, where an appropriate TTP resides, to 
communicate securely. TTPs can be categorized according to their communication 
relationships with the users they serve [5], [6]. A TTP may provide its services through a 
combination of the different modes for different parts of its service. 
• Off-line TTPs 
An off-line TTP does not interact with the user entities during the process of the 
 given security service unless a problem occurs. Fox example, the two parties 
 directly trade their items, and in case of any problem, the TTP will be involved to 
 mediate between the parties. 
• On-line TTPs 
An on-line TTP is requested by one or both entities in real-time to provide, or 
 register, security-related information. Such a TTP is not in the communications 
 path between the two entities; rather, it is for verifying an item, and generating 
 and/or storing proof of exchange of items. 
• In-line TTPs 
An in-line TTP is positioned in the communication path between the entities. 
 Such an arrangement allows the TTP to offer a wide range of security services 
 directly to users. This means that the TTP receives the items from each party, 
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 authenticates them and delivers them to the respective parties. Since the TTP 
 interrupts the communication path, different security domains can exist on either 
 side of it. 
 
3.3. A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP  
Because 1P  and 2P  cannot share and exchange their private items directly, it is 
reasonable to design an in-line TTP model in this scenario in order to preserve data and 
algorithm privacies. 
In detection stage, data privacy includes 1P ’s quality metrics and detection rules; 
2P ’s source models. To preserve data privacy in this step, 1P  and 2P  should send 
detection rules and source models to an in-line TTP, respectively. Then, TTP will execute 
these rules on source models and compute the rule set’s fitness score. After that he sends 
the fitness back to 1P  who then updates its best rule set if the received fitness score is 
greater than current one. In addition, to preserve algorithm privacy, 2P  should not learn 
the GP iteration process, so it is better to request 1P  to apply GP to generate new rules 
and sends them to TTP for execution, and TTP returns calculated fitness score to 1P  for 
evaluation. The iteration process continues and finally, 1P  will find the best detection 
rules. In this model only TTP knows both parties’ private data and algorithms; 1P  and 2P  
will learn nothing regarding the other’s private information. Figure 3.1 shows the process 


















Figure 3.1. TTP model in defect detection 
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In correction step, because 1P  should call the routine Execute Rules and Compare 
to detect remaining defects in each correction iteration, data privacy is the same as that of 
detection phase. Only difference is algorithm privacy, and so the secure protocols have to 
keep the original process to generate refactoring solutions private. Therefore, the 
responsibilities of TTP role in this step are to preserve the same data privacy as that of 
detection and keep the refactoring generating process safe. In each iteration, 1P  sends 
refactoring operations to TTP who will execute them on source models. Next, TTP 
applies detection rule set to detect remaining defects and inform 1P  the refactorings’ 
fitness. 1P  saves the refactoring set as current best solution if it has a smaller fitness score. 
Then 1P  will generate new refactorings and require TTP to evaluate them. At last, 1P  
obtains the best solutions and then send them to 2P  to fix most detected defects. Figure 























Figure 3.2. TTP model in defect correction 
 
 
3.4. COMPARISON TO IDEAL TTP MODELS  
  The proposed TTP models are designed to follow the process of Genetic 
Algorithm, so 1P  has to interact with the TTP role for many rounds. However, they are 
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not ideal TTP models because the communication rounds between a TTP role and 1P  
would leak the fitness score of a rule set to 1P . In an ideal model, 1P  and 2P  send quality 
metrics and Genetic Algorithm; source models to a TTP, respectively. Next, the TTP runs 
A to find best detection rules and optimal refactoring solutions. Finally he applies the 
solutions to fix existing defects in source model and then returns it to 2P . In the process, 





4. PRIVACY-PERSERVING DDC PROTOCOLS 
4.1. THE ROLE OF SECURE PROTOCOLS  
TTP is an ideal model, but in reality it is hard to find a fully trusted third party. 
Even through, TTP model is definitely the guide for secure protocol design. If a new 
protocol is proved to be able to replace entire TTP role in the model, then the protocol is 
secure and implements all functions of TTP role. 
The data and algorithm privacies of Kessentini’s approach are analyzed in Section 
3.1. Algorithm privacy is not hard to preserve because it is straightforward to require 1P  
to execute most steps in the process and he only interacts with 2P  when he has to do that. 
However, to preserve data privacy is not easy because the approach executes generated 
rules on source models to obtain the best rule set. How to keep the entire private data 
secret during the execution? In fact, as mentioned in Section 3.1, to preserve privacy, it is 
indispensable to design secure version for function Execute Rules and Compare. In TTP 
model, all private data is sent to TTP and the two routines are executed by TTP too. Now, 
it is very possible to design secure protocols to replace the TTP role. 
First, let us analyze the routine Execute Rules. In every iteration of detection 
phase, each new generated rule is a combination of quality metrics. In order to apply 
these rules, the function Execute Rules will compare each rule’s thresholds with source 
models’ information, e.g. LOCCLASS, NMD, to determine if software defects exist in a 
class, which means 1P  only concerns whether these statistical indicators of each class are 
greater or less than thresholds of its detection rules instead of their actual values. Based 
on such investigation, secure comparison techniques and secure multi-party computation 
(SMC) can be applied to perform such comparison. 1P  will execute his rules and evaluate 
2P ’s software quality according to secure comparison results without learning any private 
information of source models. Also, 2P  cannot learn 1P ’s quality metrics, detection rules 
from the secure comparison protocol. 
Now, a plenty of research work has been done regarding secure comparison. 
General two-party computation was introduced by Yao [29], and general computation for 
multiple parties was introduced in [3]. Most of the existing secure protocols focus on 
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solutions of secure integer comparison problem and their applications, e.g. online auction, 
data mining without learning more details [2], association rule mining [24], web services 
[1], etc. Secure integer comparison (SC) is the starting point of SMC protocols. There are 
a plenty of specialized solutions to the problem which provides efficiency with respect to 
generic methods [7] . Most of these solutions are based on doing calculations on the bits 
of integers by using homomorphic encryption or encrypting bits as quadratic residues and 
non-residues modulo an RSA modulus. The work [20] shows that it is more efficient than 
previous ones. Therefore, the thesis integrate [20] to the designs and apply it to handle 
secure issues in rule execution. 
Second, the thesis discusses how to apply secure protocols to preserve privacy in 
the function Compare. Actually, the routine Compare is to compute fitness score for each 
rule set and in a word it is to calculate what percent of true defects are found by the 
detection rules. The secure protocols should compute the fitness without disclosing 2P ’s 
true defects to 1P . To compute the fitness score, it is the key point to get the number of 
detected true defects. In fact, it is not hard to imagine that base examples contain true 
defect set defined manually by experienced engineers and detected defects are included 
by another set, then the problem to find the number of detected true defects can be 
transformed to compute the intersection of two sets. Dot product for set intersection 
computation is another category of secure protocols and it is a perfect solution to tackle 
the security issues in the routine Compare. In the following section, the thesis will discuss 
the details of how to apply this technique to design secure version of the Compare 
function. 
 
4.2. SECURE INTEGER COMPARISON 
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) was first suggested by Yao[1] as the 
millionaires problem, in which two millionaires want to learn who is richer without 
revealing their wealth to each other. The problem with its solution gave rise to the more 
general problem, where multiple parties try to compute some function securely given 
each party contributes some secret input. Several secure integer comparison (SC) 
protocols [8] [3] [7] have been widely studied and proposed. Recently, the work [20] 
proposed a new secure comparison protocol that can be applied to check some integer 
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over an interval securely. It uses a perfect binary tree (PBT), in which the leaf level 
contains all possible integers, 0 through n1, and this protocol is designed to compare two 
integers at leaf level. Properly speaking, the secure integer comparison scheme with 
arguments (a, b) is a two-party protocol between 1P  and 2P  who have n bit inputs a and b 
respectively. At the end of the protocol, 1P  learns if b _ a without learning b. 
This scenario is exactly the same as the situation in threshold evaluation, and then 
it is possible to apply SC to get the comparison results. To understand this scheme, first, 
the concept of PBT and some definitions will be covered. In a word, a PBT is a full 
binary tree and all non-leaf nodes exactly have two children. Here a unique label (h, o) is 
used to represent a node in PBT, where h denotes the node’s height and o denotes its 
order in the layer. 
Before readers start to understand this algorithm, some special terms should be 
learnt first.  
Coverage: Given a PBT, it is said that a tree node (h1, o1) covers a leaf node (0, 
 o2) if there exists a path from (h1, o1) to (0, o2) in the tree. The covering set of a 
 given leaf node v is the set of all nodes in the PBT that cover v. The coverage of a 
 tree node v is the set of all leaf nodes covered by v. For example, in Figure 4.1,  
(2, 1) covers (0, 6). Covering set of the leaf node (0, 6) is {(0, 6), (1, 3), (2, 1),  
(3, 0)}. The coverage of (2, 1) is {(0, 4), (0,5), (0, 6), (0, 7)}.  
Representer Set: is a minimal set that is the coverage of all leaves in a set of leaf 
 nodes. In Figure 4.1, {(1, 1)} is a minimal representer for {(0, 2), (0, 3)}, and {(0, 
 4)} is a minimal representer for {(0, 4)}. Then {(1, 1), (0, 4)} is a minimal 
 representer for {(0, 2), (0, 3), (0, 4)}. 
Homomorphic Encryption [4]: is a form of encryption which allows specific 
 types of computations to be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted 
 result. For some prime p, it has the following properties. 
 
0 1 0 1( ) ( ) ( )E m E m E m m⋅ = +  
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In the algorithm Secure Comparison [20], 1P  wants to compare its private integer 
a to 2P ’s private b. First, 1P  creates a representer set for the leaf nodes (0, 0) … (0, a). 
For each level i in the PBT, 1P  creates a polynomial iT  whose root is the order of the 
representer node with height i. 1P  uses an additively homomorphic public key encryption 
scheme, E, to encrypt the coefficients and sends the encrypted polynomials to 2P  who 
calculates the covering set B of the node (0, b). For each node v in B, he securely 
evaluates polynomial v hP ⋅  on v o⋅  with help of the homomorphic property of the 
encryption. He multiplies the results with positive random numbers, and sends the 
shuffled results back to 1P  who will learn b a≤  if any of the results decrypts to 0. 
As an example of the algorithm, suppose 1P  holds a = 5, 2P  holds b = 2. Then, 1P  
creates the representer {(1, 2), (2, 0)} for the set of leaf nodes {(0, 0)…(0, 5)} which 
represents a. Next, 1P  generates cofficient set {-1, -2, 0}. He sends encrypted coefficients 
Epk(1), Epk(-2), Epk(0) to 2P  in order. 2P  finds the covering of (0,2); {(0,2),(1,1),(2,0)} and 
calculates (Epk (2) * Epk (1))r * Epk (0), (Epk (1) * Epk (-2))r * Epk (0), (Epk (0) * Epk (0))r * 
Epk (0) and sends back to 1P  in random order. 1P  sees one of the outputs decrypts to 0, 
she concludes b a≤ . It is not hard to explain the theory of secure integer comparison in a 
simple sentence. Because 1P ’s representer covers all leaf nodes less or equal to a, then 
b’s coverage must include one of nodes in the representer if b a≤ . 
In detection step, the secure protocols may apply the protocol as below. 1P  creates 
the representer for a threshold and compute coefficient set. Then he sends encrypted 
coefficients to 2P  in order. 2P  finds the coverage of its corresponding statistical indicator 
and calculates the product of encrypted coverage and coefficients. Finally he sends them 
back to 1P  randomly and 1P  will learn which one is greater based on the decryption 
output. 
The security of detection algorithm is based on the inability of either side to learn 
the other side’s item without private key. In this protocol, the only way to decrypt 1P ’s 
encrypted representer is to learn the private key, unfortunately 2P  cannot learn the key 
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because it belongs to 1P . 2P  knows the public key and then he can encrypt its data with a 
random r. Similarly, 1P  received EPR[i] = (EP[i] * E(B[i].o))r * Epk(0) = E[r *(P[i] + 
B[i].o)], then he cannot learn 2P ’s original data for he doesn’t know the random number r 
and data’s exact order. He only learns whether the sum of two integers is zero or not 
based on the property of homomorphic encryption. 
 
4.3. THRESHOLD EVALUATION ALGORITHM  
Once a secure comparison solution is found, it is not hard to integrate it to the 
threshold evaluation algorithm which executes each rule securely by calling the secure 
comparison routine. As shown in Algorithm 3, an individual rule can be divided into 
threshold set and operator set. First, it calls Secure Comparison to compare each pair of 
integers; threshold and corresponding information of source models. Then, apply 
operators to the comparison set to get variable b which is either 1 if the class contains a 
defect or 0, otherwise.  
 
Algorithm 3 Threshold_Evaluations((P1, T, O), (P2, S))  
Require: P1: T(Threshold set) = {t1, t2,. . . ,tm}, O(Operation set) ={o1, o2,. . . ,om-1}, 
 P2: S(Statistics information of source models) = { s1, s2,…, sm} 
1: C(Comparison set) = { c1, c2,…, cm}, where ci = Secure_Comparison(si, ti) 
2: b = c1 o1 c2 o2 … om-1 cm  
3: return b 
 
Take rule R1 as an example, for rule R1, T={1500, 129, 100}, O={∧, ∨}, S= 
{LOCCLASS, LOCMETHOD, NMD}. Then C={LOCCLASS ≥  1500, LOCMETHOD 
≥129, NMD ≥100} and R={c1 ∧ c2 ∨ c3}. Thus, if b is 1, then the detected class is a 
blob, otherwise if b is 0, no blob defect in this class. 
 
4.4. USING SECURE SET INTERSECTION TO COMPUTE FITNESS 
As data privacy mentioned in Section 3, the main objective is to implement secure 
protocols for Execute Rules and Compare functions. Now a secure comparison algorithm 
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is proposed, which can replace Execute Rules and allow two parties to evaluate each 
individual rule securely. In this subsection, the thesis will discuss how to apply secure set 
intersection techniques to compute fitness and replace the function Compare. 
First, let’s learn how to compute an individual rule set’s fitness score. The fitness 
function checks to maximize the number of detected defects in comparison to the 













In the function, f is normalized in the range [0, 1]; p is the number of detected 
classes and t is the number of defects in the base of example; ia  has value 1 if the ith 
detected classes exists in the base example (with the same defect type), and value 0 
otherwise. From the function, it is clear that the summation of ia  is actually the size of 
intersection between detected defects and defects in the example base. In fact, 2P  may not 
be willing to disclose true defects in the base example to 1P  because 1P  might create fake 
rules conformed to these true defects to show false effectiveness of his solution, 
otherwise. Thus, it is better to keep the true defects private while computing fitness. A 
secure Compare function is already proposed, by which 2P  can obtain the size of 
intersection of two defect set and thus learn the effectiveness of this rule set. Once 2P  
gets the size of intersection set, it is straightforward to calculate the fitness by applying 
the proposed fitness function. 
 
  
Algorithm 4 Compares((P1, D), (P2, E)) 
Require: P1: DS(Detected defect set) = ﹛ d1, d2,. . . ,dm﹜ ; P2: ES(Defect examples in 
source models) =﹛ e1,e2,…, em﹜ ; E and D are additively homomorphic semantically 
secure encryption/decryption functions, respectively; pk is the public key. 
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1: P2: EE(Encrypted defect examples) =﹛ ee1,ee2,…,eem﹜ , where eei = Epk(ei) 
2: P2: send EE to P1 
3: P1: P(Product set) = { p1, p2, …, pm}, where pi = di ×eei 
4: e = 1 
5: for all pi ∈ P do  
6:     if pi ≠  0 then 
7:         P1: e = e × pi 
8:    end if 
9: end for 
10: P1: sends e to P2 
11: P2: d = D(e) 
12: P2: learns the effectiveness of this rule set 
13: P2: computes the fitness and return it to P1 
 
In Algorithm 4, all elements in the input sets DS and ES are binary numbers, 
whose values are either 1 or 0. First 2P  uses homomorphic encryption algorithm to 
encrypt true defects and then sends the sequence to 1P  in order, who will compute each 
ip . Afterward the product of all non-zero ip  is calculated and its decryption result shows 
the size of DS and ES’s intersection. Next, 2P  computes the fitness score of this rule set 
and return it to 1P , who will update his optimal rule set based on this score. 
 
4.5. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT DETECTION 
As mentioned in section 2, one of the research goals is to implement 
Defect_Detections. Now it is already described that how to apply SC to preserve privacy 
in routine Execute Rules; how to compute fitness securely by set intersection algorithm. 
Thereby, it is not hard to design secure protocols for detect detection. As the protocol 
shown in Algorithm 5, the thesis divide the original process into two sequences of actions 
performed by 1P  and 2P , respectively. They call Threshold Evaluations and Compares to 
preserve data privacy, and 1P  controls the process of GP to achieve algorithm privacy. 
27 
 
Algorithm 5 Defect_Detections((P1, R0), (P2, S, E)) 
Require: (P1, R0): P1’s initial rules, (P2, S, E): P2’s source models and defect examples. 
1: P1: i = 0 
2: P1: initial_population = R0 
3: P1: fitness_ rˆ  = 0 
4: while i ≤m do 
5:     P1: fitness_ rˆ i = 0 
6:     for all rj in Ri do 
7:           P1: detected_defects_rj = 0 
8:          for all classk in S do  
9:               P1, P2: (P1, b) = Threshold_Evaluations((P1, T_ rj , O_ rj ), (P2, classk)) 
10:             if b = 1 then 
11:                 P1: detected_defects_rj = detected_defects_rj + 1 
12:             end if 
13:        end for 
14:        P1: fitness_rj = Compares((P1, detected_defects_rj), (P2, E))  
15:        if  fitness_ rˆ i < fitness_rj then 
16:             P1: fitness_ rˆ i = fitness_rj 
17:             P1: rˆ i = rj 
18:        end if 
19:    end for 
20:    if  fitness_ rˆ  < fitness_ rˆ i then 
21:         P1: fitness_ rˆ = fitness_ rˆ i 
22:         P1: rˆ  = rˆ i 
23:     end if  
24:     P1: Ri+1 = Generate_New_Population(Ri) 
25:     P1: i = i + 1  
26: end while 
27: return  rˆ  
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4.6. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT CORRECTION  
Once 1P  finds the best detection rules, he will choose proper refactoring to fix all 
detected defects. For correction, they also need to exchange information to correct 
existing defects and evaluate the effectiveness of refactoring operations. In the process, 
1P  chooses a refactoring set for the current defects and sends them to 2P  for execution. 
2P  will run the refactoring operators on source models and then they will exchange 
information to compute the fitness for this refactoring sequence. Next, 1P  may apply 
Genetic Algorithm to generate new offsprings or new refactorings and follow the same 
procedure as previous to evaluate them. The iteration continues and finally, the process 
outputs the best refactoring set which can fix most defects. Algorithm 6 shows the secure 
correction process. 
  
Algorithm 6 Defect_Corrections((P1, rˆ ,  f0), (P2, S)) 
Require: (P1, rˆ , f0): rˆ  is the best rule set,  f0 is initial refactoring operations; (P2,  S): S is 
the source model. 
1: P1: initial_population = f0  
2: P1: i = 0  
3: P1: fitness_ ˆf = MAX_INTEGER  
4: while i ≤ n do 
5:       P2: Execute_Refactorings(fi, S) 
6:       P1: detected_defects = 0 
7:       for all classk in S do 
8:            P1, P2: (P1, b) = Threshold_Evaluation((P1, T_ rˆ , O_ rˆ ), (P2, classk)) 
9:            if b = 1 then 
10:              P1: detected_defects = detected _ defects + 1 
11:          end if 
12:      end for  
13:      P1: fitness_fi = |detected_defects| 
14:      if  fitness_ ˆf  > fitness_fi then 
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15:          P1: fitness _ ˆf  = fitness_fi  
16:          P1: ˆf  = fi 
17:       end if 
18:       P1: fi+1 := Generate_New_Population(fi) 
19:       P1: i = i + 1 
20: end while 
21: return ˆf  
 
 
4.7. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS  
  The total running cost depends on the number of candidate item sets , e.g. number 
of detection rules and thresholds, number of refactorings, the rounds of GA and GP. 
Suppose in detection step k original rules are generated from quality metrics and source 
models contain l classes; each iteration will generate m new rules and the GP iteration 
will terminate after n rounds, then time complexity is O(k*l+m*n*l). Similarly, in 
correction step the time complexity depends on initial refactorings, the number of 
generated new refactorings in each iteration and iteration rounds. 
In this scheme, the running cost is highly related to comparison times because the 
algorithm would encrypt data in each comparison round, which is the most time-
consuming action in the comparison process. In addition, SC protocol should be called 
for each threshold of every individual rule, so the number of total execution rounds is 
inevitable huge. Suppose each rule has r average thresholds, then SC would be executed 
r*(k*l+m*n*l) times. The thesis will verify the performance of SC protocols and discuss 
how to improve it in experimental results section. 
 
4.8. COMPARISON TO TTP MODELS  
Secure protocols are already implemented to preserve data and algorithm privacy 
and they can replace TTPs to some extent. Now let us compare the two types of different 
secure solutions and analyze what information is disclosed in the process. In the detection 
and correction TTP models, 1P  and 2P  never interact except that finally 1P  sends 
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refactoring solutions to 2P . TTPs execute each individual rule, every refactoring 
operation and compute fitness, so no private information would be revealed. However, in 
secure protocols, they have to communicate to execute rules and compute fitness, then 1P  
or 2P  may learn something in the communication rounds. For example, 1P  would 
generate a plenty of rules and a certain number of them may evaluate a same index, e.g., 
a rule contains ‘IF (NMD ≤  100)’; another rule includes ‘IF (NMD ≥  90)’, if both 
comparison results are true, 1P  would know the interval of NMD and even the exact 
value in some cases.  
Moreover, 2P  will learn how to compute fitness while he calls the routine 
Compares, which is the information disclosed in this protocol. By contrast, if 1P  is 
requested to calculate the fitness, it should know the total number of true defects which is 
an input parameter of the fitness function. In short, some information has to be revealed 
by the protocol Compares anyway.  
However, compared to TTP models, the proposed secure protocols preserved 
most private data and algorithm information even if there exist risks to leak minor part of 
them. For example, in the routine Execute Rules, 1P ’s private quality metrics and 
detection rules are kept secret; 2P ’s source models are never disclosed to 1P  too. In 
addition, Compare function keeps true defect information private and 1P  cannot learn it.  
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5. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS 
This section will introduce an example case here to review the secure defect 
detection and correction process. In the process, rules R1, R2 and R3 are used to detect 
source models. Take a piece of source models in appendix as example and suppose class 
PrjInfos contains more than methods and the class is over 1500 lines, then it is a blob 
based on rule R1. Similarly, suppose class GanttApplet contains spaghetti code and class 
DeprecatedProjectExport- Data violates rule R3. 
In detection step, 1P  will generate initial rule set R1, R2, R3 and request 2P  to 
collect related information from source models for comparison. For instance, R1 requires 
LOCCLASS and LOCMETHOD, then 2P  should count the number of code lines in each 
class and the number of code lines of each method in each class. To judge whether a class 
violates R1, the only way is compare R1’s thresholds to collected information from 2P . 
For security reason, the protocols apply secure 2-party computation technique for 
comparison. Thus, no confidential information will be leaked and the two parties can still 
learn what kinds of defects exist in each class. 1P  and 2P  will call Threshold Evaluation 
routine to do the detection as following. 
 
Threshold_Evaluation(( 1P , {1500, 129, 100}, {∧, ∨}), ( 2P , {1621, 145, 134})) 
 
Then, 1P  and 2P  call Secure Comparison to compare each pair of integers. 
 
Secure_Comparison(( 1P , 1500), ( 2P , 1621)) 
Secure_Comparison(( 1P , 129), ( 2P , 145)) 
Secure_Comparison(( 1P , 100), ( 2P , 134)) 
 
Next, 1P  combines these results together with operators as below. 
 
1621≥1500 ∧ 145≥129 ∨ 134≥100 
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In this example, the output is true and then 1P  determines that class PrjInfos is a blob for 
secure comparison results judge that it violates the rule R1. This is just a round of an 
individual rule to detect a single class. Finally, each rule should be applied to detect every 
class and the total rounds will be up to 3 n×  (e.g. n classes in source models). After 
detection, 1P  and 2P  call Compares to compute fitness score of this rule set. Suppose 1P  
expresses its detection results with an integer set as below. 
 
{ id } ={{1, 0, 0}, {0, 1, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 1}} 
{ ied } = {E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), 
 E(0), E(0), E(1)} 
 
Each subset represents the defects of a class and the three integers in the subset denotes 
three types of defects. The integer is either 1 if the class contains this type of defect or 0 
otherwise. Then, 1P  encrypts each integer and sends the sequence set { ied } to 2P  who 
should also describe its example base with an integer set. 
 
{ ie } = {{1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 1}} 
 
Next, 2P  calculates the product of each pair of ied  and ie , then sums them up together to 
get the following result.  
 
E(1) × E(1) = E(1 + 1) = E(2) 
 
1P  receives E(2) from 2P  and learns that the intersection is two after decryption. So the 
fitness of this rule set will be 
 
f = (2/3 + 2/3)/2 = 0.67 
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Next, Genetic Programming process will perform crossover and mutation to generate new 
offsprings (new rules), and 1P  and 2P  will apply these new rules to detect source models 
again. For example, GP algorithm removed OR operation in R1, then a new rule R1’ will 
be generated as below. 
 
R1’ : IF (LOCCLASS ≥  1500 ∧ LOCMETHOD ≥  129) THEN defect = blob 
Thus, for secure comparison algorithm, the input and output would be changed as the 
following. T={1500, 129}, S={LOCCLASS, LOCMETHOD}, O={∧}, C={LOCCLASS 
≥1500, LOCMETHOD ≥  129} and R=C1 ∧ C2. 
If the new rule’s fitness is better than previous ones, 1P  will record the new rule 
as current best solution. Finally, 1P  will get best detection rule set which is suitable to 
2P ’s source models. In correction step, this rule set will be used to detect existing detects 
after each correction. 
For correction, initially 1P  creates a n-dimensional refactoring solutions and sends 
them to 2P  for execution. In the above example, suppose the refactoring solutions are as 
below. 
 
MoveMethod(getWebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData), 
MoveAttribute(WebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData), 
PushDownMethod(actionPerformed, GanttApplet, DeprecatedProjectExportData) 
 
In the process, a fitness function is used to quantify the quality of the proposed 
refactorings, which checks to minimize the number of detected defects using the 
detection rules generated in detection step. 
Next, 1P  will generate new refactoring solutions by Genetic Algorithm and 
request 2P  to execute them again. For instance, the mutation operator may change 




MoveMethod(getWebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData), 
MoveAttribute(WebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData), 
MoveRelation(GanttHTMLExport, getDescription, PrjInfos); 
 
If the new solutions are better than all of others by fitness comparison, then 1P  saves 
them as current best solutions. At last, the process will select an optimal solution which 





6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
This section will discuss how to test the secure protocols. For Generic 
Programming and Generic Algorithm in defect detection and correction, the work [13] 
has already verified their precision and recall rates, so the thesis do not plan to provide 
additional evaluations. This section will focus on the secure comparison protocol because 
it is the most time-consuming part in the whole process. 
First, it is very important to compute the running time of secure comparison for it 
is important to know how it impacts the proposed approach. The cost of this algorithm 
highly depends on the bit size of encryption and decryption keys. Usually the keys are 
very large binary numbers, e.g. 512; 1024; 2048 bits, and people prefer to choose long bit 
keys for it is hard to be cracked. However, long keys really make the algorithm much 
inefficient and even unacceptable. The experiments show that for if  two integers’ 
comparison in the range of [0 - 512], the cost is 0.18s for 1024 bit keys and over 1.25s for 
2048 bit keys. Because the protocols have to do comparison for every detection rule, the 
total running cost will be unbearable if long bit keys are used. In reality, it is safe enough 
to use 1024 bit keys to encrypt private data. Then in the following experiments, only 
1024 bit keys are applied to the detection and correction algorithms. 
Kessentini tests his approach with some open-source programs: GanttProject 
(Gantt for short) v1.10.2, Quick UML v2001, ArgoUML v0.19.8, and Xerces-J v2.7.0 as 
the Table 6.1 shown. The performance of Kessentini’s approach is highly related to 
Generatic Algorithm which is actually unchanged in this scheme, whose running cost 
indeed depends on comparison times, the number of classes and rules. Thus, in the 
experimental settings, the thesis will pay more attention on measuring its performance 
under different size of source models rather than how many programs are used. Then the 
research work decides to use GanttProject and Xerces to do it for they are medium-sized 
programs and the results would clearly show the difference between two approaches. In 
addition, some classes or some defects are removed from the program to verify the 




Table 6.1. Program Statistics 
Systems Number of Classes KLOC 
GanttProject v1.10.2 245 31 
Xerces-J v2.7.0 991 240 
ArgoUML v0.19.8 1230 1160 
Quick UML v2001 142 19 
 
As previously mentioned, three types of defects will be analyzed. In a word, blobs 
are classes that do too much; spaghetti Code (SC) is code that does not use appropriate 
structuring mechanisms; finally, functional decomposition (FD) is code that is structured 
as a series of function calls. These represent different types of design risks. In the study, 
the thesis uses a cross validation procedure and one open source project is evaluated by 
using the remaining two systems as base of examples. For example, Xerces-J is analyzed 
using some defects examples from Gantt. The complete lists of metrics, used to generate 
rules, and applied refactorings can be found in [16]. 
Table 6.2 summarizes the testing results. In the experiments, SC represents the 
approach with secure comparison, and SC & SI means that both secure comparison and 
set intersection are applied to the approach. DET and COR are the abbreviations of 
detection and correction, respectively. The experimental results are not exciting because 
the proposed approach is much slower than the original one. The main reason is that the 
protocols have to do too many secure comparisons in order to preserve both parties’ 
privacies. For example, the GanttProject program contains 245 classes and it is supposed 
that every individual rule has three operators in average, because a rule set includes three 
different rules to detect three types of defects, then the total number of comparison to 
evaluate a rule set is 245 × 3 × 3 = 2205. It is mentioned that the average cost of running 
secure comparison once is 0.18s, thus the detection algorithm will cost 2205 × 0.18 = 
396.9s which is very close to the experimental result. However, you may observe that 
there is no significant difference between the costs of SC and SC & SI, which is because 
the set intersection algorithm only runs once for an entire rule set. In the first scenario of 
GanttProjects, the execution rounds for SC and SC & SI are 2205 and 1, respectively, that 
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is why SI didn’t cost too much time even if it still contains encryption and decryption 
algorithms. 
The table also shows that even if some classes are removed from GanttProject to 
make it a small project, the running cost is still much higher than Kessentini’s approach. 
To make it worse, the algorithm will cost similar time to do the detection even if all 
defects are deleted from the program, which is because the protocols cannot reduce the 
comparison times in detection step. For a larger program like Xerces-J, the detection 
process will cost nearly twenty minutes and it will spend almost fifty minutes to fix 
existing defects. 
 
Table 6.2. Running Time Comparison(Seconds) 
Systems Classes Blob SC FD 
Original SC SC&SI 
DET COR DET COR DET COR 
Gantt 245 10 14 9 7.76 16.87 350.46 704.21 359.07 801.57 
Gantt 81 10 14 9 1.84 4.19 97.44 199.83 97.87 202.51 
Gantt 81 0 0 0 1.64 0 96.26 0 96.74 0 
Xerces 991 11 17 10 41.51 79.87 1219.21 2933.26 1321.04 3107.25 
 
 
Another important issue is that the secure comparison and set intersection 
algorithms are implemented with C language because the approach integrates a C/C++ 
package, GMP into the developed algorithms for large integer computation, but the 
detection and correction algorithms are written with Java. Then, it will cost more time to 
call C routines in a Java program. Next step, all codes will be rewritten with C language 
and be integrated together, thus the algorithm will be much efficient than the current one. 
Moreover, in the future’s work, it is possible to divide private data into different security 
levels and only encrypt data in high levels, then the algorithms’ performance will be 
significantly improved and  its expected running time might be reduced to the same 
magnitude as the original one. 
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper analyzes privacy issues in design defect detection and correction and 
then models TTP models in both defect detection and correction processes. In addition, it 
designs new secure protocols to allow a third party to perform such detection and 
corrections without leaking any private information. The main contribution is that the 
thesis propose a practical approach to replace TTPs and make it possible for a Consultant 
to offer detection and correction services while preserving both parties’ privacy. 
Moreover, the secure comparison is a time-consuming part in detection process, 
and the thesis analyzes its performance and compares running time of the approach with 
that of the original one. Experimental results prove the effectiveness of this approach. In 
the future, more defect detection and correction algorithms will be investigated and 
design common secure protocols may be designed, which are suitable to most popular 
detection and correction algorithms.  
Finally, the proposed secure protocols may leak some private information 
compared to ideal models. In the following work, more effective and efficient SDDC 
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